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ABSTRACT
This paper presents a complete general equilibrium model with flexible wages where the degree to
which wages and productivity change when cyclical employment changes is roughly consistent with
postwar U.S. data. Firms with market power are assumed to bargain simultaneously with many
employees, each of whom finds himself matched with a firm only after a process of search. When
employment increases as a result of reductions in market power, the marginal product of labor falls.
This fall tempers the bargaining power of workers and thus dampens the increase in their real wages.








jrotemberg@hbs.eduWhen employment rises over the business cycle in the United States, real wages tend to
rise somewhat as well. However, the size of these increases appears to be too modest to be
consistent with a variety of models. This paper shows that it is possible to rationalize this
modest elasticity of wages with respect to employment in a model with ﬂexible wages. The
model follows Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) in supposing that workers and ﬁrms must
incur costs to ﬁnd one another and that wages are set by bilateral bargaining. Rather than
considering perfectly competitive ﬁrms that each employ one worker, the model considers
large, imperfectly competitive ﬁrms.
The existence of imperfectly competitive ﬁrms allows one to consider changes in market
power as a source of business ﬂuctuations, and it turns out that this helps to make real
wages less procyclical. The reason is straightforward. Unlike what happens when technology
ﬂuctuates, ﬁrms that raise their output for non-technological reasons have a lower rather
than a higher marginal product of labor. This means that workers can only hold them up
for less and must thus moderate their wage demands. The result is that wages rise less when
employment rises.
While the paper models changes in market power as being the result of changes in the
elasticity of demand facing the typical ﬁrm, changes in market power can also be equated
with situations where ﬁrms adapt to changes in their demand by changing their quantities
instead of changing their prices. The result, as here, is that the ratio of price to marginal
cost is aﬀected, and this is the broad deﬁnition of a change in market power that motivates
the analysis. As discussed by Rotemberg and Woodford (1991), seeing output ﬂuctuations
as due to ﬂuctuations in market power is closely related to the view that these ﬂuctuations
are due to “demand” rather than being due to “supply.”
The basic logic that reductions in market power that lead to increased employment are
associated with a weaker bargaining position for workers is present in Rotemberg (1998)
as well. That model, however, is static so that real wages actually decline when output
increases. In the present paper, as in the Mortensen-Pissarides framework generally, there
are two additional forces that tend to cause wages to rise with employment. The ﬁrst is that
1jobs become easier to ﬁnd in booms so that workers are less desperate for a job than they
are in recessions. This strengthens the bargaining position of workers and leads them to
obtain higher wages. This force is quantitatively important and motivates Hall and Milgrom
(2005) to study bargaining solutions for wages that are less sensitive to worker’s alternative
options. In this paper, by contrast, I use the Nash bargaining approach used in Mortensen
and Pissarides (1994), so this force remains important.
The second force is that, in standard speciﬁcations of the costs of hiring workers, the
increased labor market “tightness” in booms raises the cost of recruiting workers. When
bargaining, workers realize that their employer would have to replace them if the workers
were to depart. An increase in recruiting costs thus strengthens the bargaining position of
workers and leads to higher real wages. The quantitative importance of this force depends
on the size of the economies of scale in the posting of vacancies.
In the Mortensen and Pissarides model (1994) each ﬁrm hires just one worker and can
post at most one vacancy. In Pissarides’s (2000, chapter 3) extension of the model to large
ﬁrms, however, each ﬁrm can post multiple vacancies. Pissarides (2000) assumes that each
of these vacancies has the same cost, but it is easy to imagine that the technology of posting
jobs is subject to economies of scale. For example, an advertisement for many employees
might not cost much more than an advertisement for fewer. One of the contributions of this
paper is to show that these economies of scale have profound implications. The reason is that
they imply that the marginal recruitment cost in booms, when ﬁrms hire many workers, may
not be signiﬁcantly larger than in recessions, when ﬁrms hire fewer of them. This obviously
reduces the extent to which real wages are procyclical.
The literature on the extent to which real wages are procyclical is voluminous. As shown
in the Abraham and Haltiwanger (1995) survey, the results depend on how real wages are
measured as well as on the sample period. Using aggregate data, the speciﬁcation they report
that leads to the most procyclical real wages has an elasticity of the real wage with respect
to employment of under .3. Using individual data, estimates tend to be higher, and a ﬁnding
of a unit elasticity is not uncommon. It is arguable, however, that neither the elasticity of
2aggregate wages nor the elasticity of individual wages with respect to employment corre-
sponds to the wage elasticity implied by the model. The reason is that both individuals and
ﬁrms diﬀer in their characteristics. While the model below abstracts from these diﬀerences,
an important property of bargaining models is that diﬀerences in ﬁrm characteristics tend
to translate into wage diﬀerences for identical workers (a phenomenon often referred to as
“rent sharing”). This means that it should be straightforward to generalize the model so
that diﬀerent ﬁrms pay diﬀerent wages.
The average change in wages experienced by people who change jobs would then depend
on the kinds of industries that expand and contract. A measure of wage changes that seems
more robustly related to the model below is thus the average wage change experienced by
people who stay in their jobs. Bils (1985) shows that these wages are much less procyclical
than those of job changers. His estimates suggest that a one percent increase in the un-
employment rate reduces the wages of people who stay in their jobs by between .4 and .6
percent. Bils and McLaughlin (2001) show that people who stay in the same industry see
their wage rise by about .2 percent when aggregate employment rises by one percent. This
suggests that it would be desirable to have models that are consistent with an elasticity of
the wage with respect to employment in the range .2 to .5. Given the uncertainty involved, it
would also be attractive if small variations in the parameters could generate both somewhat
higher and somewhat lower elasticities.
Supposing that employment ﬂuctuations are due to changes in market power also helps
to rationalize the relatively weak tendency of labor productivity to be procyclical. Shimer
(2005a) and Mortensen and Nagypal (2005) show that rather substantial changes in tech-
nological opportunities are needed if one is to suppose that such changes account for the
bulk of cyclical movements in U.S. labor markets. The reason is that, while improvements
in technology raise labor demand, they raise real wages as well, so ﬁrms have only a mod-
erate incentive to hire additional workers. Large increases in technological opportunities are
thus needed to rationalize even moderate increases in employment. This implies that labor
productivity rises substantially as well.
3By contrast, reductions in market power that lead ﬁrms to hire additional workers do
not necessarily lead to large increases in labor productivity. Indeed, one might imagine that
the existence of diminishing returns to labor implies that labor productivity would actually
have to fall when employment rises. However, as emphasized by Hall (1988), the increasing
returns that tend to go hand in hand with market power can imply that productivity rises
when the labor input is increased. In this paper, I thus choose the level of increasing returns
in production to match the extent to which labor productivity tends to rise with employment.
As can be seen, for example, in Shimer (2005a) and Yashiv (2005), the literature on
matching models in macroeconomics is extensive. This paper is most directly related to
Shimer (2005a), whose main conclusion is that observed labor productivity movements
are not large enough for matching models to rationalize movements in labor market vari-
ables. Another reason Shimer (2005a) provides an ideal point of reference for discussing
the strengths and weaknesses of the approach presented here is that both models predict a
strong negative correlation between vacancies and unemployment. In the detrended data he
presents, this correlation is -.95, suggesting that a stable Beveridge curve is a highly desirable
feature of a model that purports to explain labor markets.
The paper shares some common ground with Yashiv (2005), who also lets ﬁrms post
multiple vacancies and allows shocks other than technology shocks to aﬀect hiring. Yashiv
(2005) considers the eﬀects of changes in interest rates (which are modelled as aﬀecting the
discount rate) and of changes in separations. He ﬁnds, however, that the combination of
these shocks generates a labor share (and thus a real wage) that is much more procyclical
than in the data. His model’s implied elasticity of the labor share with respect to employment
exceeds 3, when this elasticity is actually slightly negative in U.S. data.
In highlighting disturbances to market power in a search-and-matching framework, the
paper is related to Ch´ eron and Langot (2000), Trigari (2004), Krause and Lubik (2003), and
Walsh (2005). These papers consider ﬁrms with sticky prices whose ratio of price to marginal
cost varies with monetary policy. Cheron and Langot (2000) show that the combination of
sticky prices and the search-and-bargaining framework can simultaneously generate stable
4Phillips and Beveridge curves. At the same time, their model does generate real wages that
are much more strongly related to employment than they are in their data.
Trigari (2004) and Walsh (2005) do not focus on the extent to which real wages are
procyclical. Rather, they show that replacing competitive labor markets by a search-and-
bargaining framework enhances the ability of sticky price models to explain the response of
output, employment, and inﬂation to monetary disturbances. On the other hand, Krause
and Lubik (2003) stress the unrealistic implications of their model concerning both the
procyclical movements in real wages and the joint behavior of vacancies and unemployment.
One diﬀerence between their speciﬁcation and the one considered here is that they suppose
that the productivity of each job is independent of how many other employees the ﬁrm has
hired. This means that increases in employment do not reduce the marginal product of labor
of existing jobs and thus do not exert downward pressure on wages.
Rigid prices may well provide the most empirically plausible reason for cyclical ﬂuctu-
ations in market power. Nonetheless, this paper takes a more direct route and considers
ﬂuctuations in market power that are due to ﬂuctuations in the elasticity of demand facing
the typical ﬁrm. Such ﬂuctuations are of interest in their own right, and a valuable recent
analysis rationalizing them is provided in Ravn et al. (2006). It is thus of interest to learn
whether changes in the elasticity of demand with empirically plausible characteristics can
explain aggregate ﬂuctuations.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section lays out the dynamic equations of the
model. Section 2 considers steady states. Section 3 focuses on how steady states change as
either market power or technology changes. Looking at diﬀerences between steady states
both provides clearer intuition (because the steady-state equations are particularly simple)
and gives meaningful elasticities (because the economy converges to its steady state rela-
tively quickly). This latter point is established numerically in Section 4, which analyzes the
dynamic behavior of the model economy near its steady state. Section 5 concludes.
51 Model
Worker preferences and the matching of workers to ﬁrms are based on a discrete-time version
of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994). A constant number of individuals ¯ H would like to work
at the current wage wt, but only Ht of them actually work. The rest, ut, are unemployed so
that
ut = ¯ H ¡ Ht: (1)
Those who are unemployed at t have a probability of having a job at t + 1 equal to ft, so
this job-ﬁnding probability varies over time. Meanwhile, those who have a job at t have
a probability s of being unemployed at t + 1, where this separation probability is kept
constant on the grounds that Shimer (2005b) and Hall (2005b) have argued that this is a
good approximation to employment dynamics. This approximation simpliﬁes the analysis
considerably, and it seems worthwhile to know whether an economy that experiences only
ﬂuctuations in the ﬁnding rate can replicate some of the cyclical features of actual economies.
In this approximation, the dynamics of unemployment are given by
ut+1 = s( ¯ H ¡ ut) + (1 ¡ ft)ut: (2)
As in Pissarides (2000) and Shimer (2005a), the ﬁnding rate ft is assumed to depend on
the ratio of vacancies posted by ﬁrms vt to unemployment ut. For small ﬂuctuations, this






where ´ is a positive parameter.











¿ is the consumption of individual i at ¿, ˜ ¸ is a parameter, and ±i
¿ is an indicator that
equals one if the individual is unemployed at ¿ and zero otherwise. Letting wt denote the
6wage at t in terms of time t goods, and supposing that individuals have access to a ﬁnancial
asset that has a real return r, individual i’s asset holdings at the beginning of t + 1 are
A
i




t + wt ¡ Tt + ±
i
t(ˆ ¸ ¡ wt)];
where Tt and ˆ ¸ represent lump sum taxes and unemployment insurance payments at t,
respectively. For individuals not to all prefer to consume zero at certain dates, ¯(1+r) must
be equal to one.
The linearity of the utility function (4) implies a constant real rate r as in Shimer (2005a).
Since Andolfatto (1996), several researchers have considered search-and-bargaining models
that let the real rate vary because consumers’ utility functions have the constant relative
risk aversion (CRRA) form. With diﬀerences in people’s employment histories, the CRRA
becomes more manageable if one supposes that perfect insurance against being unemployed
is available, so that ex ante identical individuals all have the same consumption ex post.
However, this insurance implies that people prefer being unemployed to working, which is
somewhat in tension with supposing that individuals search for work and threaten their
employers with departure in order to increase their wages.1
If one postulates CRRA preferences with the property that period utility is separable in
consumption and leisure, the level of consumption aﬀects the amount of additional income
that makes people indiﬀerent between working and not working. When consumption rises,
the marginal utility of income falls and reservation wages rise, which leads to more pro-
cyclical wages. It may be possible to weaken this eﬀect by removing the perfect-insurance
assumption. This eﬀect can also be eliminated by following den Haan et al. (2000) and
supposing that, as in (4), period utility depends on a linear combination of consumption and
leisure. Reservation wages are then constant. Thus, two beneﬁts of (4) are the constancy of
reservation wages and the tractability of the model, even in the absence of perfect insurance.
Given these preferences, let Uu
t denote the value to a worker of being unemployed at the
1Merz (1995) adopts the ﬁction of a family whose members all insure each other against unemployment.
This ﬁction does not avoid the problem if individual family members are somewhat selﬁsh. In this case,
moral hazard would lead their search eﬀort to be ineﬃciently low.
7beginning of t, while (Ue
t + wt) denotes the value of being employed. Letting ¸ = ˜ ¸ + ˆ ¸ be





t = ¸ + Et¯fft(U
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t = Et¯f(1 ¡ s)(U
e
t+1 + wt+1) + sU
u
t+1g;
where the operator Et takes expectations conditional on information available at the begin-
ning of period t. Taking the diﬀerence between the second and the ﬁrst of these equations,
and letting ∆t ´ Ue
t ¡ Uu
t ,
∆t = Et¯(1 ¡ s ¡ ft)(∆t+1 + wt+1) ¡ ¸: (5)
The behavior of ﬁrms depends on the cost of recruiting. Because I depart somewhat
from standard assumptions concerning this cost, I discuss it in some detail before turning
to other determinants of ﬁrm proﬁtability. In the Pissarides (2000) analysis of large ﬁrms,
vacancies are supposed to have a constant cost c, and all vacancies are equally likely to be
ﬁlled. If total vacancies are vt and the total number of people hired at t is utft, as in the
analysis above, the probability that any one vacancy is ﬁlled is utft=vt. For a large ﬁrm that
can post many vacancies, the expected cost of recruiting a worker is then cvt=utft.
In the case of large ﬁrms, however, it need not be the case that the cost of posting vi
vacancies is linear in vi. Indeed, whether this cost is interpreted as the cost of advertising
openings in an information source or as the cost of deciding how tasks need to be split up
among workers to obtain the outcomes that the ﬁrm seeks, it is easy to imagine that this
cost is subject to economies of scale.2 For this reason, it is worth considering a more general
2Vacancies are often measured by the Conference Board help-wanted index. Interestingly, having this
index increase by one percent may well increase the costs of the ﬁrms placing these adds by less than
one percent. Abraham and Wachter (1987, p. 209) report that this index is obtained by counting the
total monthly number of job advertisements placed in major newspapers. This total number rises when
advertisers repeat their advertisements a larger number of times. Placing an advertisement n times does
not generally cost n times the amount it costs to place an advertisement once. For example, the Boston
Globe’s May 2005 rates indicate that the cost of placing an advertisement for four additional days within
a week is zero once the advertisement runs for Sunday and two additional weekdays (the Sunday rate per
agate line is $25, the daily rates once an ad appears on Sunday is $5, and the weekly rate is $35). See
http://bostonworks.boston.com/mediakit/ratecards/. This example indicates that even the marginal cost
of placing an additional ad may fall when more ads are placed.






The case of ²c = 1 then corresponds to the Pissarides (2000) analysis of large ﬁrms.3
Vacancies that are posted at t allow the ﬁrm to increase its employment at t+1 beyond
(1¡s)Hi
t, where Hi
t is its employment at t and where a fraction s of these employees depart.
Following the analysis of Pissarides (2000), a ﬁrm that posts vi
t vacancies can expect to
hire vi
tutft=vt additional workers.4 The analysis is simpliﬁed by supposing that ﬁrms have
access to a technology where the posting of these vacancies ensures that exactly vi
tutft=vt
new employees are hired.5 It follows that
H
i







Total hiring costs for this ﬁrm are thus c(vt(Hi
t+1¡(1¡s)Hi
t)=utft)²c so that the marginal



















At a symmetric equilibrium, each ﬁrm’s total hiring equals utft=N, where N is the number







Since the elasticity of Át with respect to vt equals ²c, it falls when this parameter falls.
By contrast, the elasticity of Á with respect to (utft) remains minus one regardless of ²c.
3Yashiv (2005) also considers costs that do not rise linearly with vacancies, though he only studies the
case of diminishing returns to scale.
4This requires that ﬁrms be suﬃciently small that the eﬀect of their vacancies on the ratio uf=v can be
neglected. In the case where the number of ﬁrms N is large, one obtains essentially identical formulas by
neglecting the eﬀect of changes in a ﬁrm’s vacancies on total hiring and supposing instead that the total
number of workers hired (utft) distributes itself evenly over the total number of vacancies posted by ﬁrms.
5This requires that there be a slight negative correlation between the probability of success of the diﬀerent
vacancies that are posted by a particular ﬁrm. One advantage of this speciﬁcation is that it ensures that all
the symmetric ﬁrms in the model remain of the same size, since they all post the same number of vacancies
in equilibrium.
9A one-percent increase in uf always lowers by one percent the increase in vacancies that is
needed to attract an additional worker, so it reduces the cost of these extra vacancies by
about one percent. A one-percent increase in v, by contrast, has two eﬀects. While it raises
the amount by which vacancies must increase to attract an additional worker, it also raises
the number of vacancies the ﬁrm must post to attract its standard share of the uf workers
available for hire. With ²c < 1, this increase in the baseline level of vacancies reduces the
percent by which costs rise when vacancies are increased to hire an additional worker.
The upshot of this discussion is that one cannot generally determine the size of changes in
Á from changes in v and u, even if one has ﬁtted a matching function to recover empirically
the way that f responds to vacancies and unemployment. What remains possible is to use (2)
to compute the unemployment rates induced by changes in ft. Knowing these unemployment
rates, one can use one’s knowledge of f to obtain the necessary changes in vacancy rates.
Increases in f tend to raise uf because the percentage decline in u is not as large as the
percentage increase in f. So, f can only increase if v rises as well. The increase in uf exerts
a negative inﬂuence on Á, while the inﬂuence of the increase in v is positive. With suﬃciently
low values of ²c, however, this latter eﬀect is small, so the overall eﬀect on Á is ambiguous.
In the extreme case where ²c is close to zero, an increase in total hiring actually leads to a
decline in the cost of obtaining an additional worker.
The timing of moves by ﬁrms and workers is the following. At the end of period t, ﬁrms
are assumed to learn the productivity and market power conditions for t + 1. They then
choose their price for that period and the vacancies vi
t they post at t. To simplify the analysis,
the cost of posting these vacancies is paid at t + 1, when the recruitment eﬀort of the ﬁrm
bears fruit. Each worker then bargains individually with the ﬁrm. Because this bargaining
is eﬃcient and ¸ is less than the marginal product of labor, all workers stay at the ﬁrm with
which they are matched. The typical ﬁrm ﬁnds itself with Hi
t workers. Assuming its capital
is ﬁxed at Ki, its output Y i






t) ¡ Φ); (9)
10where the function F is homogeneous of degree one in both arguments, zt is an economy-wide
indicator of productivity, and Φ is a ﬁxed cost. This ﬁxed cost can be set to zero when there
is perfect competition among ﬁrms but needs to be positive to ensure that proﬁts are zero if
ﬁrms have market power.
This market power, in turn, is the result of imperfect substitutability of the goods pro-
duced by diﬀerent ﬁrms. Thus, aggregate output yt and consumption are aggregators of the
output and consumption of individual goods. Supposing that the average price charged by
all other ﬁrms at t is pt, a ﬁrm that charges P i












where ²dt is the elasticity of demand, which is allowed to vary over time. The reason the
relative price term is multiplied by y=N is that each ﬁrm sells an equal share of total output
y if they all charge the same price.
Firm i’s real ﬂow of proﬁts at t, ¼i


















t is the ﬁrm’s real wage. Goods cannot be stored so the ﬁrm ﬁnds it in its interest
to set Y i
t = Di
t along the equilibrium path. Oﬀ the equilibrium path, worker departures do
lower Y i
t relative to Di
t. Moreover, a ﬁrm that loses a worker at t and does not change its
number of vacancies at the end of t can expect to end up with (1¡s) fewer workers at t+1.
It follows that a ﬁrm that loses a worker must anticipate that it may have to increase its
hiring at the end of t to make up for this loss. The departure of a worker thus leads to an











where the ﬁrst term represents the marginal product of labor (as in Pissarides (2000)), while
the second term represents the additional expected recruiting costs. Note that the recruiting
costs Ái
t correspond to vacancies posted in period t. These recruitment costs are discounted
11because they are paid at t + 1 and they are multiplied by (1 ¡ s) to take account of the
possibility that these recruitment costs would have been incurred anyway with probability
s.6
As in Pissarides (2000), the wage is set through a generalization of Nash bargaining and
maximizes a weighted geometric average of the gains of the two parties. Workers are assumed
to bargain individually and simultaneously. One can think of each worker as bargaining
with a separate representative of the ﬁrm. Thus, each worker and the representative that he
bargains with assume at the time of bargaining that the ﬁrm will reach a set of agreements
with the other workers that leads these to remain employed. They also assume that the price
has been set so that all the worker’s output is sold if the works stays with the ﬁrm.
The perceived gain to the representative of the ﬁrm of keeping a worker is then given in




























t) + Et¯(1 ¡ s)Á
i
t + ∆t]: (13)
At a symmetric equilibrium, all ﬁrms charge the same price and the marginal product of
labor ztFH(Ki;Hi
t) is equal to a common value that I label ½t so that this equation becomes
wt = ¡∆t + ®(½t + Et¯(1 ¡ s)Át + ∆t): (14)
When ﬁrm i decides at the end of t ¡ 1 on vacancies as well as prices and capital for t,
6The probability of leaving the ﬁrm s is assumed to be identical with the worker’s probability of becoming
unemployed, as in Shimer (2005a). This is only a simpliﬁcation because many workers move from one job
to another, so the probability that a worker separates from a ﬁrm is higher than the probability that this
worker separates from active employment. One attraction of incorporating both separation rates explicitly
is that, even if the two rates are assumed to be constant, more workers would transition from job to job in
booms. This would mean that vacancies are “more productive” in booms and could thereby further reduce











Given its choice of capital and labor, the optimal price is the one that ensures that the
ﬁrm’s output Y i
t is equal to the ﬁrm’s demand Di
t. 7 Using this price as well as the wage


























t=pt)ztFH + Et¯(1 ¡ s)Á
i
t) + (® ¡ 1)∆t
i
:
Since the path of ∆ involves payoﬀs of workers outside the ﬁrm, the ﬁrm treats this path













































A positive value of dÁi
t=dHi
t discourages hiring, because it implies that increases in hiring









t+1 ¡ (1 ¡ s)Hi
t
;
which is indeed positive when ²c < 1. The reason is that extra hiring at t implies lower
expected hiring at t + 1 which raises marginal recruiting costs if ²c < 1.
Combining these equations, and noting that zt(F(Ki;Hi
t)¡Φ) equals y=N at a symmetric
equilibrium, the ﬁrst-order condition with respect to Hi










= wt + Át¡1 ¡ Et¯(1 ¡ s)Át
Ã
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7This requires that the ﬁrm have nothing to gain in the bargaining stage by having the capacity to produce
more output than is demanded at the price that it has set. No such beneﬁt exists if, as assumed above,
wages are set under the supposition that all workers are indeed needed to produce the quantity demanded.
This still raises the question of why the ﬁrm does not recruit some workers just so they can be ready to
carry out the job of any worker who leaves. This possibility can be neglected if one assumes that vacancies
attract workers only if they involve a speciﬁc task that is not already carried out by another worker. See
Rotemberg (1998) for further discussion.
13where ¹t is the ratio of zF to output (zF ¡ Φ), xH ´ HFH=F, and xK ´ KFK=F is equal
to (1 ¡ xH) due to the homogeneity of F. This homogeneity also implies that HFHH =
¡KFHK = ¡xKFH=e, where e is the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor.
Because the ﬁrm’s hiring costs are concave if ²c < 1, it is important to check that the
ﬁrm satisﬁes its second-order condition for an optimum, at least along a path where all ﬁrms
satisfy (15). Using (14) in the above expression for dUi
t=dHi
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Assuming a constant elasticity of substitution e between capital and labor, the second











































































For e not too far from 1, the ﬁrst two terms in this equation are negative, as is required
for the second-order condition to hold.8 The concavity of R makes the ﬁrst term in curly
brackets positive, which could potentially lead to violations of this condition. However, (7)
also implies that d2Ái
t=dHi2
t is positive when ²c < 1, so that the last term in curly brackets is
positive as well; and this contributes to satisfying the second-order condition. Because this
term is quantitatively important in the calculations reported below, a brief discussion seems
worthwhile.
8The second-order condition is only a necessary condition for the ﬁrst-order condition to be associated
with a proﬁt maximum; it does not guarantee that there do not exist other employment paths with even
larger values of Ui. One might be particularly concerned that the ﬁrm would prefer to hire only occasionally
and keep its hiring equal to zero at other times, as suggested by Kramarz and Michaud (2003). While this
is both a realistic possibility and one that might be optimal if the model were treated as valid globally, I
neglect it to maintain the simple representative-ﬁrm framework. One way to rule out this behavior even if
it were implied by the equations spelled out in the text is to suppose that these equations are valid only
locally and that, for example, in each period the ﬁrm loses some employees whose replacement is essential
to keep production positive.
14When ²c < 1, ﬁrms are somewhat discouraged from hiring workers at t, because doing
so raises future hiring costs and thereby raises wages. The last terms in (16) show that
this eﬀect becomes even more important as ﬁrms increase their hiring. The reason is that
recruiting costs rise faster with recruitment for low levels of hiring. As the ﬁrm increases its
hiring and needs ever less future hiring, it thereby makes the derivative of recruiting costs
with respect to hiring larger. This discourages hiring and thereby leads the optimum to
correspond to the point that satisﬁes the ﬁrst-order condition.
It is worth comparing the ﬁrst-order condition (15) to the corresponding condition in the
more standard model (Pissarides 2000), where ﬁrms have one worker at most and where Át
is simply the expected cost of recruiting a worker at t for t+1. Free entry then implies that








½t ¡ wt ¡ Át¡1 + Et¯(1 ¡ s)Át = 0: (17)
Comparing (15) and (17), it is apparent that the coeﬃcients on wt and Át¡1 are the same.
However, the coeﬃcients on the marginal product of labor and on Et¯Át are diﬀerent. The
diﬀerences in these coeﬃcients give insights into the changes introduced by my “large-ﬁrm”
assumptions. First, supposing that the ﬁrm’s demand curve is less than inﬁnitely elastic
lowers the attractiveness of hiring workers. This just represents the standard monopolistic
distortion. This tendency to hire fewer than the eﬃcient number of employees is tempered
somewhat by Nash bargaining, because workers absorb in lower wages a fraction of the
reduction in price that is induced by expanding output.
Interestingly, two diﬀerences between (15) and (17) remain even if one assumes that
ﬁrms are perfectly competitive. The ﬁrst is that, with xK > 0 and e < 1, a ﬁrm lowers its
marginal product of labor by hiring additional workers (where this reduction in the marginal
product of labor is larger when the elasticity of substitution e is smaller and when the share
15of capital is larger). This provides an inducement to “overhire.”9
The second diﬀerence is that, with ²c < 1, marginal recruiting costs fall when the ﬁrm
recruits more workers. A ﬁrm that increases its employment at t tends to increase its wage
as a result of needing to recruit less heavily at t+1. The ﬁrm thus faces a reduced incentive
to hire workers at t. It should be apparent that the sum total of these eﬀects on the path
of employment (for given levels of Át+j) depends on the parameters that one chooses. It is
important to stress, however, that these changes relative to the standard model need not by
themselves have any important eﬀect on the extent to which real wages are procyclical. This
issue is discussed further below.
If the marginal product of labor ½t is exogenous, a symmetric equilibrium is a path for
ut, vt, ft, Át, ∆t and wt that satisﬁes (2), (3), (5), (8), (14) and (15). If ½t = ztFH(K;Ht),
one must include this equation as well as (1) among the equilibrium conditions and must
solve for the path of ½t, Ht, ut, vt, ft, Át, ∆t and wt.
I analyze this model in several steps. First, in the next section, I compute its overall
steady state.
2 Steady State
The steady-state implication of (5) is
∆[1 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ s ¡ f)] = ¯(1 ¡ s ¡ f)w ¡ ¸;
where the unsubscripted values of ∆, w, and f represent their steady-state values. The
9See Stole and Zwiebel (1996) for this eﬀect in the context of a somewhat diﬀerent bargaining model.
Chapter 3 of Pissarides (2000) avoids this eﬀect by supposing that the ﬁrm takes the wage as given when
it decides how many employees to hire. This exogeneity is not entirely consistent with Nash bargaining,
however. Cahuc and Wasmer (2001) show that the Pisssarides (2000) solution is correct if ﬁrms are free to
adjust their capital after they have ﬁnished bargaining with their workers and before production takes place.
In the more plausible case where capital is purchased earlier so that its level is ﬁxed for the period between
bargaining and production, this “overhiring” force also aﬀects ﬁrms’ choice of capital, since a ﬁrm can just
as easily lower the marginal product of labor by under-employing capital as by over-employing labor. Merz
(1995) and Andolfatto (1996) ﬁrst solve optimal planning problems where these issues do not arise. These
papers also show that the social planning solutions can be decentralized as competitive equilibria. However,
the decentralization results of Merz (1995) and Andolfatto’s (1996) are derived under the assumption that
wages are independent of the amount of labor and capital that ﬁrms employ.
16steady-state implication of (14) is
∆(1 ¡ ®) = ¡w + ®(½ + ¯(1 ¡ s)Á):
Together, these equations imply that
h
1 ¡ ®¯(1 ¡ s ¡ f)
i
w = (1 ¡ ®)¸ + ®
h
1 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ s ¡ f)
ih
½ + ¯(1 ¡ s)Á
i
: (18)
This equation can be interpreted as giving the “bargaining wage.” This wage is a linear
combination of the value of leisure, the marginal product of labor, and the cost of replacing
the worker by recruiting a new one.
Since (2) implies that uf = ( ¯ H ¡ u)s in a steady state, it follows from the deﬁnition of
unemployment (1) that total hiring uf in a steady state equals total separations sH. Using









½ = w + mÁÁ; (19)
where mÁ ´ 1 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ s)[1 ¡ ®(1 ¡ s)(1 ¡ ²c)=s]. This equation can be interpreted as a
“hiring equation,” where the ﬁrm equates the beneﬁt of hiring an additional worker (which
is related though not necessarily identical to the marginal product of labor) to its marginal
cost (which includes a wage and a hiring cost component).
For a given “replacement rate” ¸=w, the bargaining and hiring equations (18) and (19)
are linear in w=½ and Á=½. Thus, one can readily solve for these two ratios as a function of
the parameters m;s;f;®;e;xH;¹;²c, ²d, and ¸=w. Once one has the ratios w=½ and Á=½, one
can use (16) to check whether the second-order condition holds for the representative ﬁrm
at this steady state. It does so for all the parameters considered below.
The calibrated parameters used in the analysis are given in Table 1. Under the assumption
that a period lasts one month, the ﬁrst ﬁve of these (¯, s, f, ´ and ®) are taken from
Shimer (2005a) and do not vary across speciﬁcations. In the speciﬁcation that is labelled
“alternative” the other calibrated parameters are also close to the values in Shimer (2005a).10
10The two minor diﬀerences are that ²d is set to a large ﬁnite value rather than to inﬁnity and that ¸=w is
set to .4 rather than having ¸=½ set to this value. Note also that e is irrelevant when xH = 1, as in Shimer
(2005a).
17In the baseline speciﬁcation, by contrast, some of the parameters are diﬀerent. The
replacement rate ¸=w has been the subject of some discussion. Shimer (2005a) sets ¸=½
(which is very similar to ¸=w for his parameters) equal to .4 on the basis that, on average,
unemployment insurance in the United States typically pays workers somewhat less than
four-tenths of their regular wage. Hagedorn and Manovskii (2005) have emphasized that
¸=w ought to be higher than the fraction of wages covered by unemployment insurance
because people also give up their utility from leisure when they work, and this utility ﬂow
should be included in ¸.
For any value of ¸=w below 1, workers prefer working to not working, so they are “in-
voluntarily unemployed” whenever they do not have a job. Setting this ratio very close to
1, on the other hand, would be inconsistent with the observation that reported well-being
falls substantially when workers become unemployed (see Di Tella et al. 2003). This leads
Mortensen and Nagypal (2005) to criticize Hagedorn and Manovskii (2005) for using param-
eters such that ¸=w = :983, which implies that workers gain only 1.7 percent of ﬂow utility
by going from unemployment to employment. Keeping in mind this criticism, while also
taking into account the fact that low values of ¸=w tend to make real wages too procyclical,
my baseline simulations are computed under the assumption that ¸=w = :9.
To allow for diminishing returns to labor, the baseline parameters involves xH = HFH=F <
1. Because of its use in other studies, and because insight is gained by keeping this parameter
constant across several diﬀerent speciﬁcations, the baseline value of this parameter is set to
2/3 even though the current model is not one where this parameter necessarily equals the
share of income paid to labor. The equilibrium labor share equals xH¹w=½ so that it is also
aﬀected by ¹ and w=½. This means that the speciﬁcations I consider below do not all have
the same steady state labor share.
For the most part, the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor e is set to 1.
However, the relevant elasticity for wage setting is the short run substitutability after capital
has been installed, and this is arguable much smaller. For this reason, I also consider the
case where e = 1=3.
18An equally important production function parameter that needs to be calibrated is ¹,
the steady-state value of ¹t. In a symmetric equilibrium with ﬁxed capital, (9) implies that
Yt = zt(F(K;Ht) ¡ Φ): (20)
In a steady state with constant z, the parameter ¹ = zF=Y is related to the ratio of ﬁxed
costs over output Φ=Y by the relationship ¹ ¡ 1 = Φ=Y . If z and K are constant and the
log deviations of Ht around the steady state are relatively small, the percentage deviations
of output and employment from their steady-state values satisfy
˜ Yt = ¹xH ˜ Ht; (21)
where a tilde represents a log deviation from a steady state.
This equation implies that, if z fails to vary cyclically, xH is known, the cyclical value
of employment is correctly measured, and the cyclical value of Y is subject to measurement
error, one can estimate ¹ from a regression of ˜ Yt on ˜ Ht. Using BEA data of output, hours,
and employment from the business sector, I ran such regressions by detrending the three
variables, using the method outlined in Rotemberg (2003). Using quarterly data from 1950:1
to 2002:1, the coeﬃcient of employment in the regression of output on employment was 1.11.
If xH = 2=3, this coeﬃcient is consistent with (21) when ¹ = 1:7. This parameter value has
the advantage of allowing the model without technology shocks to account for these cyclical
productivity movements.11 The baseline value for ¹ is somewhat smaller (¹ = 1:545) to
ensure that the labor share is below one in the main speciﬁcations discussed below.12
Given these increasing returns, one can expect ﬁrms to have market power. This market
power is important for the analysis because it allows markups to ﬂuctuate. For illustration,
this market power is captured by letting the steady state elasticity of demand ²d equal two.
While it could be feared that this would lead to implausibly large markups of price over
marginal cost, I show below that this is not the case.
11The coeﬃcient of total hours in a regression of output on total hours was only 1.07 and implies a ¹ of
only about 1.6. This may be a more accurate measure of returns to scale, because hours per worker are well
known to be procyclical. Unfortunately, ﬂuctuations in hours per worker are beyond the scope of the model.
12The relationships between wages and employment discussed below are quite similar if ¹ is set to 1.7
instead.
19When there are short-run technology shocks, the coeﬃcient in the regression of output on
employment need not recover ¹ because technology shocks aﬀect both output and employ-
ment. Moreover, imperfect competition is not needed in this case for output to ﬂuctuate.
For this reason, several results concerning the eﬀect of technology disturbances are also pre-
sented for the case where where ﬁrms have constant returns to scale in production and face
perfectly competitive output markets.
The last parameter that needs to be calibrated is ²c. As discussed above, it is standard in
search models to suppose that ²c = 1. Kramarz and Michaud (2003) provide some evidence
on this parameter. They use French ﬁrm-level data on hiring and on certain hiring expendi-
tures, namely expenditures on job advertising and search-ﬁrm fees. They run regressions of
the change in these expenditures on the change in hiring between 1992 and 1996 and include
a quadratic term in their regressions.
This term allows them to reject the hypothesis that hiring costs are linear in hiring.
However, their estimated degree of returns to scale is small. Starting at the mean of their
sample, a ﬁrm whose hiring was one percent larger experienced about a .97 percent increase
in its hiring costs. The true value of ²c could be lower, however, if the degree of economies
of scale were larger in the component of hiring costs that involves the ﬁrm’s own employees
or output. Also, the cross-sectional variability of changes in hiring costs across ﬁrms might
be driven by cross-sectional diﬀerences in the extent to which ﬁrms open new plants. New
plants may have a diﬀerent eﬀect on hiring costs than do changes in the number of employees
who are associated with a ﬁxed capital stock, and it is the latter that are most relevant for
the model. For purposes of illustration, I thus report results for ²c = :2 as well as for the
conventional case where ²c = 1. The results are monotone in the values of this parameter,
so these examples ought to be informative about the eﬀect of this parameter more generally.
Table 2 reports the steady-state values of w=½ and Á=½ for several combinations of pa-
rameter values. These ratios of wages relative to the marginal product of labor and marginal
recruiting costs relative to the marginal product of labor can be used to compute the ratio
of price to marginal cost. If the marginal cost of labor were simply taken to be the wage,
20w=½ would be the inverse of the markup of price over marginal cost. Given the existence of
recruiting costs, and their inﬂuence on wages, the inverse of the markup equals (w+mÁÁ)=½)
and this is reported in the last column of this table.
As can be seen in this table, there are substantial diﬀerences in wages and marginal
recruiting costs relative to the marginal product of labor across these speciﬁcations. To gain
intuition for these diﬀerences, it is worth starting with speciﬁcation (6), which is close to
the one used in Shimer (2005a). In this speciﬁcation, price is equal to marginal cost, as in
models where ﬁrms take prices as given in both goods and labor markets. Changing from
this speciﬁcation to (7), where capital is used in production with xK = 1=3 and e = 1,
so that the production function takes the Cobb-Douglas form with plausible capital costs
leads to a substantial increase in both w=½ and Á=½. The reason is that the dependence of
the marginal product of labor on the amount of labor hired now leads to “overhiring.” This
has the eﬀect of lowering the marginal product of labor both relative to the real wage and
relative to recruiting costs. More formally, an increase in xK=e raises the left-hand side of
(19) so that ½ must fall relative to a linear combination of w and Á. Since (18) requires the
wage to be an unchanged linear combination of ½ and Á, the wage must rise relative to ½
while falling relative to Á (so that Á=½ rises more than w=½). The overall eﬀect of this is to
lead price to be substantially lower than marginal cost. Given that the labor share is less
than one, this need not be inconsistent with zero proﬁts as long as the required payments to
capital are suﬃciently low.
Going from speciﬁcation (7) to speciﬁcation (5) involves increasing market power, which
lowers the left-hand side of (19) and reduces overhiring. While this does indeed lower w=½
and Á=½ and the inverse of the markup of price over marginal cost, the size of this eﬀect
is relatively modest. Raising ¸=w from .4 to .9 (when going from speciﬁcation (5) to (2)
or from speciﬁcation (3) to (1)) raises w=½ for the simple reason that workers have access
to a superior alternative. This increase in wages relative to the marginal product of labor
implied by (18) requires that Á=½ fall to satisfy (19). In other words, the increase in the
wage reduces the attractiveness of obtaining a worker, so the marginal recruiting cost must
21fall relative to the marginal product of labor.
Lowering ²c when going from speciﬁcation (5) to speciﬁcation (3) (or from speciﬁcation
(2) to (1)) reduces both w=½ and Á=½. The reason is that the lower value of ²c makes marginal
hiring less attractive by lowering the right-hand side (19). This tends to raise the marginal
product of labor relative to the wage. The result is that the baseline speciﬁcation has almost
the same w=½ as the alternative speciﬁcation (6). The higher value of ²c and the lower value
of ¸=w in the latter tend to raise w=½, but this is oﬀset by the eﬀect of the higher value of
xK=e in the former. The main diﬀerence between the baseline and the alternative is that
Á=½ is much larger in the latter. The reason is that increases in ²c have a particularly large
positive eﬀect on recruiting costs.
Speciﬁcation (8) and (9) are designed to analyze the eﬀects of setting ²c = :2 in a standard
Mortensen-Pissarides model in which output is a linear function of the labor input and em-
ployment ﬂuctuations are due exclusively to ﬂuctuations in technology. These speciﬁcations
thus feature ﬁrms that sell their output in a perfectly competitive market. Speciﬁcation (8)
departs from the speciﬁcation (6) only in raising ¸=w, so that it is a variant of the analysis
in Hagedorn and Manovskii (2005). Speciﬁcation (9) then lowers ²c and thus sheds light on
the eﬀects of this parameter.
The purpose of speciﬁcation (4), instead, is to analyze the eﬀects of lower the elasticity
of substitution of labor for capital relative to the baseline speciﬁcation. This change also
raises the left-hand side of (19), so it leads to more hiring, higher w=½, and higher Á=½. The
result is that this speciﬁcation has considerably lower markups of price over marginal cost
and its implied labor share is only slightly below one.13
I now turn my attention to the analysis of employment ﬂuctuations. These are modelled
as either being due to changes in technological opportunities (as in most analyses based on
Mortensen and Pissarides (1994)) or as being due to changes in the elasticity of demand ²d.
Changes in this demand elasticity provide a particularly simple modelling device for non-
13Except for speciﬁcations (2) and (5), whose role is to illustrate the eﬀects of changes in parameters, all
the speciﬁcations in the table have labor shares below one.
22technological changes in labor demand, but the analysis should also be relevant for other
settings where labor demand changes without changes in z. It should, in particular, be
adaptable to models of sticky prices where the demand for labor changes when ﬁrms with
rigid prices face a change in the demand for their products. Following the lead of Mortensen
and Pissarides (1994), I suppose that ¸ stays constant in the face of the ﬂuctuations in z
and ²d.
I consider two diﬀerent approaches for calculating the model’s implications regarding
the eﬀects of changes in z and ²d on employment and wages. Both these methods rely
on approximations near a steady state, so they both apply only when ﬂuctuations in the
driving variables are relatively small. In one method, I suppose that the variables in the
model always obey the steady-state relations (18) and (19), and I consider approximations of
these relations around a particular point. Since it is important that variables not depart too
much from this point, it is convenient to suppose that this approximation is taken around
the point that describes the equilibrium when the exogenous variables take on their mean
values. Because of the supposition that these steady-state relations always hold, I label this
the “stochastic steady-state” method for computing the behavior of the model.
An obvious alternative is to rely on the dynamic equilibrium relations, and approximate
these around a steady state. This is the second method that I employ. It might seem that
this second method is superior since the dynamic equations do not imply that the economy
always obeys the steady-state equations (18) and (19). However, the ﬁrst method has some
beneﬁts and I start with it.
3 Stochastic Steady States
Using U.S. data on unemployment duration, Shimer (2005a) and Hall (2005b) infer ft from
the likelihood that people who have been unemployed for less than one month in a particular
survey month remain unemployed in subsequent surveys. Shimer’s (2005a) resulting estimate
of ft averages .45, so that nearly half of the unemployed ﬁnd jobs within a month. Since
the coeﬃcient of lagged unemployment in (2) equals (1 ¡ s ¡ ft), such a high ﬁnding rate
23implies that unemployment converges quickly towards the “steady state” implied by ft. This





so the implied unemployment rate equals s=(ft + s). Figure 1 shows the actual U.S. un-
employment rate and this implied unemployment rate. The implied rate is computed using
Shimer’s (2005a) method for obtaining ft and setting s equal to the average separation rate
in this sample, where this separation rate is also computed using his method. The actual
and implied unemployment rates have similar cyclical movements, though the implied rate is
somewhat less variable than the actual rate.14 While the ﬁt is far from perfect, Figure 1 sug-
gests that it would be worthwhile to know whether a model that can generate these implied
movements in the unemployment rate is also consistent with weak procyclical movements in
the real wage.
Because this is a model where convergence to the “stochastic steady state” appears to be
rapid, the stochastic steady state may be a good approximation to the dynamic equilibrium
of the model. Indeed, the results below indicate that calculations based on these stochastic
steady states approximate closely the simulations of the nonlinear version of the model
reported in Shimer (2005a). In addition, the next section shows that the elasticity of wages
with respect to employment is similar in this stochastic steady state to the corresponding
elasticity in a dynamic equilibrium model. Aside from these similarities, the main virtue of
analyzing stochastic steady states is their simplicity. All that is required to understand the
behavior of the variables in the model are the two equations (18) and (19), so it is easy to
gain intuition for the results. In particular, it becomes easy to understand what features of
U.S. data lead a low ²c to be necessary for the procyclical movements in real wages to be
mild.
Using a tilde to denote logarithmic deviations around a mean outcome and unsubscripted
14The actual and implied series overlap considerably more if the implied series is given by st=(st + ft) so
that it includes variations in the separation.










˜ ft = ˜ ut + ˜ ft; (24)
where the second equality follows from (23).
The linearization of (3) is
˜ ft = ´(˜ vt ¡ ˜ ut): (25)








which gives a downwards sloping Beveridge curve for ´ · 1 + s=f.
The variables ˜ ut, ˜ vt and ˜ ft are perfectly correlated in this stochastic steady state. This
implies that the ratio of the standard deviation of ˜ v to the standard deviation of ˜ u can be
read from (26) to equal (1+s=f)=´¡1. Similarly, the ratio of the standard deviation of ˜ ft to
that of ˜ ut can be obtained from (24) and equals 1+s=f. These ratios of standard deviations
can then be compared to those in US data as well as those from the non-linear simulations
in Shimer (2005a).
These comparisons are provided in Table 3, which also shows the relative variabilities of
v=u and labor productivity. The ﬁrst row of this Table shows ratios of standard deviations
reported in Shimer (2005a, p. 28) using US quarterly data from 1951 to 2003.15 In these data,
u, v and f are nearly perfectly correlated so that the ratios of the standard deviations are
essentially equal to the bivariate regression coeﬃcients between the corresponding variables.
The second row of Table 3 reports the relationships among labor market variables implied
by the stochastic steady state model (the analysis of the model’s implications for labor
15Note that since the relationship between these variables is linear and deterministic according to the
stochastic steady state model, it does not matter whether the data it is compared with are quarterly or
monthly.
25productivity are taken up below) . Since the implied connections between u, v and f depend
only on the parameters s, f and ´, they are identical across all the speciﬁcations I consider.
The ﬁnal row reports ratios based on the nonlinear simulations of the eﬀects of productivity
shocks reported in Shimer (2005a, p. 39). The last two rows are quite similar, demonstrating
that the stochastic steady state version of the model provides a good approximation for
computing these statistics. The correspondence with US data is not nearly as good. Indeed,
several of these model-generated moments become more similar to the observations if ´ is
lowered to equal .5. The ratio of the standard deviation of v to that of u, in particular,
falls to 1.15, which is quite close to the observed value of 1.06. On the other hand, that
value of ´ = :28 has the advantage that it comes close to matching the empirical ratio of the
standard deviation of v=u to the standard deviation of f. This equals about 3.2 in the data
while it equals 3.5 in this calibration. With ´ = :5, this ratio falls to 2, and this considerably
understates this particular relative variability.
The tendency of ˜ v to change dramatically whenever there is a small change in aggregate
employment is visible Figure 2, which plots the logarithms of both help wanted advertisement
and employment. The mean was subtracted from both series and this allows them to be
displayed with the same scale. To gain a sense of the diﬀerences in variability that are
involved, employment dropped by 2 percent from its peak in 1979:11 to its trough in 1982:12
while the index of help wanted advertisement dropped from a value of 100 in 1979:11 to
a value of 51 in 1982:12. Using detrended monthly data, the regression coeﬃcient of the
logarithm of help wanted advertisements on total nonfarm employment is around 8.16
These movements aﬀect the model’s predictions regarding wages. This can be seen by
linearizing (8), which gives
˜ Át = ²c˜ vt ¡ ˜ ut ¡ ˜ ft = ²c˜ vt ¡ ˜ Ht; (27)
where the second equality follows from (24). The rise in ˜ v implied by (26) leads this equation
16This was done using monthly data from 1951.01 to 2005.05. Because the data are monthly, I modiﬁed
the parameters of Rotemberg (2003) so that the objective function involves the covariance between the cycle
at t and the cycle 64 months hence, while the constraint is that the cycle at t be uncorrelated with the
diﬀerence between the current trend and the average of the trends at t + 20 and t ¡ 20.
26to imply that, if ²c = 1, ˜ Á rises by about 7 percent when employment rises by one percent.
Equation (18) then requires the wage to increase sharply. With a lower value of ²c this eﬀect
is muted and it is possible for ˜ Á not to rise at all.
Using (25) to substitute for ˜ vt in (27) and using (23) to substitute for ˜ ut in the resulting
















The level of ²c such that the marginal hiring cost is unaﬀected by the ﬁnding rate makes
the expression in square brackets zero and thus satisﬁes
²c =
´s
(1 ¡ ´)f + s
;
which equals .0266 for the calibrated values of the other parameters. For higher values of ²c,
˜ Á is increasing in ˜ f.
The log-linearization of the bargaining equation (18) yields
h
1 ¡ ®¯(1 ¡ s ¡ f)
iw
½
˜ wt = ®[1 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ s ¡ f)]
h















Using the deﬁnition ½t = ztFH, the deviation in the marginal product of labor ˜ ½ is given
by




By using (30) to substitute for ˜ ½t in (29) and using (28) to substitute for ˜ Át in (29) and
then ﬁnally using (24) to replace ˜ ft by ˜ Ht, one obtains an equation relating ˜ wt to ˜ Ht and ˜ zt.
If there are no changes in technological opportunities so that ˜ zt = 0, this equation gives the
elasticity of the wage with respect to employment.
Lest this argument seem too mechanical, it is worth understanding the economic logic
that allows one to compute this key elasticity using just the bargaining steady-state relation.
Suppose that a change in the elasticity of demand leads to an increase in the job-ﬁnding rate.
27Steady-state considerations allow one to pin down by how much this increases employment,
and thus the extent to which the marginal product of labor falls if z is unchanged. The
wage also depends on how much the marginal recruiting cost is aﬀected, and this depends
not only on the ﬁnding rate and on unemployment (which is determined by the ﬁnding rate)
but also on the level of vacancies. However, if one knows how the ﬁnding rate depends on
vacancies and unemployment, one also knows the level of vacancies that is consistent with
the given combination of the unemployment and ﬁnding rates. This vacancy rate can then
be used along with the unemployment and ﬁnding rates to compute the marginal hiring
cost Á. In bargaining, the wage depends only on the marginal product of labor, the ﬁnding
rate, and hiring costs. Since all three of these determinants of wages can be derived from
the ﬁnding rate (or the level of employment), one can compute how the wage is related to
employment from this equation alone. Interestingly, this calculation does not depend on the
original impulse that leads ﬁrms to hire labor, as long as this impulse aﬀects ½ only through
its eﬀect on employment.
Table 4’s ﬁrst column with results displays these elasticities for some selected parameter
values. For the baseline case, this elasticity is around .4, which is close to the microeconomic
evidence on the wages of people who keep their jobs. The table also shows that changes
in the parameters towards those employed in Shimer (2005a) increase this elasticity to the
point that it becomes too large relative to the empirical evidence.
Raising ²c so that it equals one implies that recruiting costs rise substantially with em-
ployment, so the elasticity of the wage increases to 4.5. With ²c = :2, by contrast, these
recruiting costs rise less. Even if ²c is lowered to the value of .0266 where marginal recruiting
costs are independent of employment, the wage still rises even though the marginal product
of labor falls. The reason is that an increase in employment is also associated with a higher
ﬁnding rate for jobs and this improves the bargaining position of workers.
This explains why ¸=w has such a strong eﬀect on this elasticity. When ¸=w = :4, workers
vastly prefer employment to unemployment. Workers are thus in a very weak bargaining
position when the ﬁnding rate is low, so they accept low real wages. An increase in the
28ﬁnding rate has a big eﬀect on the bargaining position of the workers (since they now have
less to lose from not forming a bond with a particular employer), so the bargained wage
rises substantially. By contrast, when ¸=w = :9 the bargaining position of workers is not so
diﬀerent in the boom and the bust, so real wages are less procyclical.
Speciﬁcation (4) is interesting because it shows that the real wage becomes nearly acycli-
cal when the changes in labor demand are due to ²d and the elasticity of substitution between
capital and labor is lowered to 1/3. The reason this elasticity has such a large eﬀect is that
it governs the extent to which the marginal product of labor falls when employment rises.
With a lower value for e, the marginal product of labor falls more and this keeps the rise
in the real wage small. When labor demand is driven by technology shocks, lowering the
elasticity of substitution of capital for labor does not have this eﬀect, because ﬁrms are not
led to hire workers that reduce the marginal product of labor.
To compute the changes in ²d that give rise to changes in employment when z is constant,
or to compute the eﬀect of changes in z, one must also use equation (19). When e is not
equal to one, the labor and capital shares (HFH=F and KFK=F) depend on the level of























Since KFK +HFH = F, the derivative of HFH=F has the same magnitude and the opposite






























In the case of constant z, equation (31) can be used to compute the extent to which the
elasticity of demand must change for any given change in employment. To carry out this
computation, one uses (30), (27), and (25) to substitute for ˜ ½t, ˜ Át, and ˜ ft, respectively, as
well as (29) to substitute for the the wage ˜ wt. The resulting response of ˜ ²d to changes in
employment is displayed in the second results column of Table 4.
29The ﬁrst thing to note about these percentage increases in the elasticity of demand that
are needed to increase employment by one percent is that they are large. They are, in
particular, much larger than the changes in demand elasticity that are needed to vary labor
demand by the same amount if ﬁrms have access to a competitive labor market. Recall that
such a ﬁrm sets its price equal to ²d=(²d ¡ 1) times marginal cost, which is in turn equal to




The linearization of this equation near a particular outcome yields
˜ ²dt = (²d ¡ 1)( ˜ wt +
xK
e
˜ Ht ¡ ˜ zt): (32)
This implies that, with the baseline values of ²d and sk=e, a one-percent increase in
employment that is accompanied by a .4-percent increase in the wage requires less than a
.75-percent increase in the elasticity of demand. By contrast, in the baseline case, a one-
percent increase in employment together with the implied .4-percent increase in the wage
requires more than a 17-percent increase in the elasticity of demand. One reason for this
large diﬀerence is that bargaining implies that workers’ wages fall when the ﬁrm’s price falls
as it increases output. This makes the ﬁrm less sensitive to its elasticity of demand.
Table 4 also shows that the size of the increase in the elasticity of demand that is needed to
raise employment by one percent is larger when ²c = 1 or when ¸=w = :4. As discussed above,
both of these modiﬁcations imply that wages rise more with employment. The increases in
labor demand that are needed to rationalize a given increase in employment are larger, so
²d must rise by more. In addition, when ²c = 1, Á rises with the level of employment. These
higher recruiting costs act as an additional brake on hiring so that ²d must rise even more.
When ²c = 1, the elasticity of demand must rise by 47 percent to increase employment
by one percent, and this seems excessive. However, it is important to keep in mind that
the elasticity of demand is mainly a modelling device to capture the eﬀect of changes in
product market distortions that could be due to other causes. Still, these changes appear
30more plausible when the model implies only that the elasticity of demand must rise by 6
percent for each percent increase in employment.
As the analysis above suggests, it is possible to reduce the required increase in the
elasticity of demand by lowering ®. However, this reduction in the bargaining power of
workers is not a panacea; it tends to increase the elasticity of the wage with respect to
employment when employment ﬂuctuations are due to changes in the elasticity of demand.
This eﬀect of ® may seem surprising because the bargaining equation (18) shows that the
wage becomes a constant equal to the reservation wage ¸ when ® equals zero. It might thus
be suspected that the wage becomes less variable as ® drops.
This intuition would be correct if ½ and Á were held constant. However, holding these
variables constant implies that a reduction in ® also lowers the wage relative to the reservation
value ¸. As shown above, reductions in ¸=w do indeed lower the elasticity of the wage with
respect to employment. It is also possible to lower ® while keeping all the other parameters
in Table 1 (including ¸=w) constant. A reduction in ® then leads to a decline in the steady
state values of w=rho and Á=rho. The resulting increase in ½ relative to ¸ ensures that ¸=w
stays constant even though the bargaining power of workers has fallen.
With this adjustment in w=rho and Á=rho, a lower ® starting from the baseline parame-
ters implies that wages are less aﬀected by the marginal product of labor and more aﬀected
by the the “net beneﬁt from being unemployed” (¡∆). This net beneﬁt rises in booms
because unemployed workers expect to ﬁnd jobs sooner. When employment variations are
due to changes in ²d, the decline in the marginal product of labor has a smaller eﬀect on the
real wage so real wages are more procyclical.17
The log-linearized equations (29) and (31) can also be used to study the eﬀect of tech-
nology shocks or, as Shimer (2005a) has framed the question, the size of the technological
changes that are needed to rationalize employment movements. To see this, follow Shimer
17When, instead, employment variations are due to changes in z, the fact that a lower ® reduces the
sensitivity of wages to the marginal product of labor makes wages less procyclical. This eﬀect is modest,
however, because ½=w falls together with ®. Take, for example, the parameters in speciﬁcation (8) and
consider lowering ® to the relatively small value of :1. This lowers the elasticity of the wage with respect to
employment from the value of 2.85 in Table 4 to 1.97.
31(2005a) and suppose that the elasticity of demand is constant. Then, after substituting for
˜ Á, ˜ ½, and ˜ f, these two equations have three unknowns ˜ H, ˜ w, and ˜ z. They can thus be solved
for the ˜ z and ˜ w as a function of the log deviation of employment.
The resulting elasticities of the wage and z with respect to employment are displayed
in the third and fourth columns of Table 4. One implication of the model that I have
discussed already is that real wages are more procyclical when employment is driven by
changes in z than when it is driven by changes in ²d, and the table shows that this diﬀerence
is quantitatively important. The elasticity of the wage with respect to employment is always
at least twice as large in the former case.
Using Shimer’s parameters in speciﬁcation (6), z must rise by 30 percent to induce a
one-percent increase in employment. This is just another way of phrasing Shimer’s (2005a)
central conclusion that productivity does not ﬂuctuate suﬃciently to justify the observed
ﬂuctuations in labor market variables.18
Shimer’s (2005a) focus is on the variability of the average product of labor and on the
relationship between this variability and that of labor market variables like unemployment,
vacancies and the ratio v=u. Diﬀerentiating the production function (20), the deviation of
labor productivity from its steady state value is
˜ Yt ¡ ˜ Ht = ˜ zt + [¹xH ¡ 1] ˜ Ht; (33)
which reduces to ˜ zt in the Mortensen-Pissarides case where xH = 1. In speciﬁcations 1-
6, ¹xH = 1:03. The term in square brackets, which also equals the elasticity of labor
productivity with respect to employment is in the case of constant z, thus equals .03. This
term is not signiﬁcant relative to the variations in ˜ z reported in the fourth column of Table
18Shimer (2005a) shows that “net productivity” must rise by about one percent for each one-percent
increase in the ratio of vacancies to unemployment. The reason this implies that productivity must rise by
about 30 percent for each percent increase in employment can be seen as follows. A one-percent increase
in “net productivity” corresponds to about a .6 percent increase in productivity itself given a ¸=½ ratio of
.4. At the same time, ´ = :28 implies that a one-percent increase in v=u raises the job ﬁnding rate by .28
percent. A one-percent increase in the job-ﬁnding rate thus requires a 1/.28-percent increase in v=u and
a .6/.28 (¼ 2) percent increase in productivity. Equation (24) implies that the ﬁnding rate must rise by
about 15 percent for each one-percent increase in employment, so a one-percent increase in employment does
indeed require a 30-percent increase in productivity.
324. To obtain the model’s prediction concerning the relative standard deviation of labor
productivity and unemployment, it suﬃces to divide the elasticity of labor productivity with
respect to employment by f=s. The reason is that the combination of (23) and (24) implies
that f=s equals the ratio of standard deviation of unemployment to that of employment.
The result is displayed in the last column of Table 4.
That an increase in ¸=½ (like the one that causes the diﬀerence between speciﬁcation (5)
and speciﬁcation (2) or from (6) to (8)) helps to reduce the required variations in productivity
was shown already by Hagedorn and Manovskii (2005). As suggested earlier, a higher value
of ¸=½ makes recessions less costly for unemployed workers, so their wages do not fall as
much. This reduces the extent to which labor costs rise in booms, so productivity need not
increase as much to rationalize a given increase in employment.
Reducing the value of ²c (as when going from speciﬁcation (5) to speciﬁcation (3) or from
(2) to (1) or from (8) to (9)) also reduces the elasticity of z with respect to employment
considerably. When Á increases with employment (because ²c > :02666), there are two eﬀects
that require higher increases in z. First, the higher value of Á leads workers to obtain higher
wages because it is more costly to replace them. Second, the higher value of Á acts directly as
a reason to keep hiring low. Both of these must be oﬀset by larger increases in productivity
for the ﬁrm to increase its employment in the ﬁrst place.
Reducing the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor also reduces the extent
to which productivity must rise, though it turns out that this eﬀect is quantitatively signif-
icant only when ²c is low.19 The source of this eﬀect is the following. When e < 1, KFK=F
rises with employment. As we saw earlier, the extent to which ﬁrms wish to overhire rises
with this share. Increases in employment thus reduce the proﬁtability of additional hiring
less than would otherwise be the case. This implies that productivity need not rise as much
to induce the ﬁrm to carry out this extra hiring.
This raises the question of whether the parameters in (1) solve the central puzzle raised
19Indeed, using the alternative parameters AA, with xH = 2=3 and e = 1=3, actually raises the elasticity
of z with respect to employment to 32.
33by Shimer (2005a). This is that the observed standard deviation of labor productivity
shown in Table 3 is too low relative to the observed standard deviations for the labor market
variables to be consistent with the standard Mortensen-Pissarides model. Comparing the
last column of Table 4 with the observed standard deviation of productivity with respect to
employment shows that the model with ²c = :2 goes a considerable way towards resolving
this particular puzzle. Interestingly, the match is somewhat closer if one keeps xH = 1 rather
than introducing capital in the way that I have one.
The model’s predicted variability of productivity would appear even less excessive if one
compared it to the variabilities of v, f and v=u. This is because, as can be seen in Table 3,
this calibration tends to overpredict the ﬂuctuations in these variables. It therefore predicts
relatively low values of the standard deviation of productivity relative to v, f and v=u.
Before closing this section, it is worth pointing out that, when subject only to shocks to ²d,
the calibrations in table 4 predict relative movements in productivity that are much smaller in
size than the observed ones. This follows from the fact that, as discussed above, the elasticity
of labor productivity with respect to employment equals .03 when z is constant. This implies
that the predicted standard deviation of labor productivity over that of unemployment equals
:03 ¤ s=f, which is negligible relative to the observed value of .11. Interestingly, ¹ was
calibrated so that it came close to explaining a diﬀerent feature of the relationship between
productivity and employment.
Nonetheless, the model subject to changes in ²d might beneﬁt from modiﬁcations that
increased the magnitude of its predicted productivity movements. At the moment, the model
predicts that real wages should be more procyclical than productivity so that the labor
share is procyclical. In aggregate data, it is well known that the labor share is somewhat
countercyclical. This need not constitute decisive evidence against the model, however,
because the model applies to individual ﬁrms and aggregate data are aﬀected by changes
in composition. Still, if it were found that the labor share is countercyclical at the typical
individual ﬁrm, this would be inconsistent with the model.
344 Approximate Equilibria near a Steady State
In this section, I consider dynamic simulations of the full model around a steady state. The
model consists of equations (1), (2), (3), (5), (7), (14), and (15) and an equation specifying
how ½t depends on Ht. In the case where e = 1, this equation takes the Cobb-Douglas
form ½t = zt¯ ½HxH, whereas it takes the CES form when e = 1=3. This gives 7 equations in
Ht, ut, vt, ft, Át, ∆t, wt, ²dt, and zt. These equations have just one state variable, namely,
the lagged value of u. They can be solved for the eﬀects of technology by treating zt as
exogenous and ﬁxing ²dt, or for the eﬀects of variable market power by ﬁxing zt and treating
²dt as exogenous. Equivalently, I consider the stochastic processes for either zt or ²dt that
are needed to rationalize a set of plausible stochastic processes for the log of Ht, ht.
The stochastic processes I consider for ht are based on the behavior of detrended employ-
ment in the business sector. Using data from 1950:1 to 2002:1, a regression of (quarterly)
detrended employment on its own lag yields a coeﬃcient of .941, while a regression on two
lags gives a coeﬃcient of 1.55 on the ﬁrst lag and -.64 on the second. This AR(2) speciﬁ-
cation ﬁts better in that the second coeﬃcient is highly statistically signiﬁcant and in that
the Durbin-Watson statistic rises from .78 to 1.99 when two lags are included instead of one.
Still, it is standard in analyzing Mortensen-Pissarides models to study AR(1) processes, and
for this reason I consider two speciﬁcations that diﬀer in the order of the autocorrelation
that describes ht.
I continue to suppose that a period lasts one month (so that the steady-state ﬁnding rate
remains .45, for example) and the two speciﬁcations are:
ht = :98ht¡1 + º
1
t (34)
ht = 1:76ht¡1 ¡ :78ht¡2 + º
2
t : (35)
The ﬁrst of these is simply the monthly analogue of the AR(1) model estimated with quarterly
data, so its coeﬃcient is the cubic root of the estimated coeﬃcient discussed above. The
second is more loosely based on the quarterly AR(2) speciﬁcation. The two models do have
in common that the peak response of employment to a shock in quarter t occurs in quarter
35t + 2.20
This model is simulated using DYNARE, which uses a method of approximating the
behavior of the model near a steady state that is close to Collard and Juillard (2001).
Because these calculations involve a second-order approximation, the variance of the shocks
º1 and º2 aﬀect the results. I choose these variances so the standard deviation of h is
approximately .02, the standard deviation of cyclical log employment in the U.S. business
sector.
One simple way of presenting the resulting simulations is to consider regressions of wages,
z, and ²d on employment with simulated data. These can readily be computed from the
impulse-response functions, and the results of these theoretical regressions are presented in
Table 5.
The elasticities of the wage and z look quite similar to those of Table 4, though the
required responses of ²d are even larger. One obvious question that arises at this point is
why the numerical implications of this fully dynamic model are so similar to those of its
steady-state counterpart. The reason is that, with a high value of ft, neither the future nor
the past exert as strong inﬂuence on the model’s current predictions. It has already been
noted that the coeﬃcient of lagged unemployment in (2) is (1¡s¡ft), which is small when
f is high. Moreover, (1¡s¡ft) is also the coeﬃcient of future ∆ in (5). Thus, a high value
of f also implies that ∆ is mostly aﬀected by developments in the very near future.
The remaining dynamic equilibrium condition is (15) and this too is consistent with
employment and wages being near their steady state as long as there is not much diﬀerence
between current and future hiring costs. Since (8) implies that hiring costs depend only
on contemporaneous variables, slow-moving changes in employment like those implied by
(34) and (35) are consistent with having the other variables in the model near the “steady-
state” values that correspond to the current level of employment. This explains also why
20In the monthly model, a shock that raises the average level of employment by one percent in the initial
quarter raises it by 1.82 percent two quarters after this shock ﬁrst has an impact. In the estimated quarterly
model, this ﬁgure equals 1.74, which is somewhat lower. On the other hand, the estimated quarterly model’s
response after three quarters equals 1.57, which is somewhat higher than the 1.61 percent response implied
by the monthly model. Thus, while the responses are similar in both cases, they are not identical.
36the statistics in Table 4 are not aﬀected very strongly by whether one seeks to rationalize
AR(1) or AR(2) stochastic processes for employment. Table 4 also shows that, as before,
lowering the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor reduces the extent to which
real wages are procyclical when employment ﬂuctuations are due to changes in ²d. While not
reported in the table, the theoretical regression coeﬃcients reported here also seem robust
to plausible changes in the standard deviations of the ºs.
One advantage of computing these approximations near a steady state is that they allow
one to look at impulse responses. One can then see the pattern of movements in either
z or ²d that is needed to justify the stochastic processes for h. The changes in z and ²d,
together with the responses of log employment and the log real wage, are depicted for the
more interesting AR(2) case in Figures 3 and 4.
Like the response of employment itself, the required responses of z and ²d in the AR(2)
case are hump shaped. However, while employment rises immediately (and then keeps rising
for some time), both z and ²d are required to fall somewhat on impact. Only later do z
and ²d rise, with their peak increases actually coming somewhat after the peak changes
in employment. These results emerge because the baseline parameter values imply that
the marginal cost of adding employees rises disproportionately as employment reaches its
peak (when future employment declines). The relevant combination of current and expected
future adjustment costs does not rise as rapidly when increases in employment are followed
by further increases. As a result, the prospect of a future increase in labor demand (because
of future increases in either z or ²d) leads ﬁrms to increase their hiring immediately. The
actual initial increase in employment is not quite as large, so the model requires that there
be an opposing force that discourages initial employment.
The initial fall in ²d that is required is equal to only about a quarter of the eventual
peak rise in ²d. By contrast, the initial fall in zt is nearly half as large in absolute value as
the ultimate increase in this productivity indicator. The underlying reason for this larger
response is that bargaining between workers and ﬁrms leads wages to fall when z falls. Small
reductions in z, which are accompanied by reductions in w in equilibrium, are therefore not
37suﬃcient to discourage hiring by the requisite amount. To track the actual increase in initial
employment, z (and the real wage) must fall signiﬁcantly.
5 Conclusions
This paper has shown that, in the context of matching models, variations in market power
have some advantages relative to variations in technology shocks for explaining the relatively
weak procyclical movements in productivity and real wages. While variations in market
power emerge as an attractive source of aggregate ﬂuctuations in employment, the particular
source of these variations considered here does not. In particular, the variations in the
elasticity of demand that are needed to explain employment ﬂuctuations are too large. While
this paper has not considered sticky prices explicitly, the ﬁndings suggest that it may be easier
to rationalize the needed market-power ﬂuctuations in such a setting. With constant prices,
a ﬁrm that sees its demand fall by one percent should lower output by close to one percent
and such a change would not seem dramatic to the agents involved. By contrast, the model
suggests that a very large reduction in the elasticity of demand is necessary to induce the
ﬁrm to reduce its output by one percent.
This paper has focused on matching the regression coeﬃcients implied by the model
(which are simply the correlation multiplied by the appropriate ratio of standard deviations)
to those that one ﬁnds in actual data. The more usual approach (see for example Shimer
(2005a)) is to try to match ratios of standard deviations in the model and in the data.
Models with a single shock tend to imply correlations near one, so the model-generated
regression coeﬃcients are close to the ratio of standard deviations. In the data, however,
many correlations — particularly those involving real wages and productivity — are smaller
than one, and so the approach followed here is not identical to one that focuses on ratios of
standard deviations.
In particular, matching the regression coeﬃcient of wages on employment in a single-
shock model leads to a real wage that is less variable than observed aggregate wages. Not
surprisingly, obtaining a model that matches a single labor-market statistic still leaves one
38far from having a complete model of labor-market dynamics. A more complete model would
incorporate multiple shocks. The regression coeﬃcient of wages on employment would then
equal the weighted average of the regression coeﬃcients from models that have only one of
the included shocks, with the weights being related to the extent to which the individual
shocks contribute to ﬂuctuations in employment.
It is thus possible in principle to have a small overall regression coeﬃcient of wages on
employment that results from some shocks that lead to large positive responses of wages to
employment and other shocks that lead to large falls in wages when employment rises. Two
studies focusing on the responses of real wages to exogenous monetary and ﬁscal disturbances
both ﬁnd small procyclical wages, however.21 This suggests that a mechanism that induces
small procyclical real-wage movements such as the one presented here, may well play a role
also in a more complete model with multiple shocks.
21See Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) for responses to monetary policy and Rotemberg and
Woodford (1992) for responses to shocks to military purchases.
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42Table 1
Calibrated Parameters
Baseline (BB) Shimer (2005a)
Alternative (AA)
¯: Discount rate .996 .996
s: Steady state separation rate .034 .034
f: steady state ﬁnding rate .45 .45
´: Elasticity of ﬁnding rate with respect to v=u .28 .28
®: Worker’s weight in bargaining .72 .72
¸=w: Value of leisure relative to work .9 .4
xH: Importance of labor in production (=
HFH
F ) 2/3 1
e: Elasticity of substitution of H for K (=
FFHK
FHFK ) 1 1/3
²d: Elasticity of demand 2 10,000
¹: Index of returns to scale in production (= F
F¡Φ) 1.545 1
²c: Elasticity of recruiting costs .2 1
Table 2
Steady-State Values
Parameters Wage over mar- Marginal recruit- Marginal cost
ginal product ment cost over over price
of labor marginal product
w=½ Á=½ (w + mÁÁ)=½
(1) Baseline (BB) 0.94 0.01 1.11
(2) BB with ²c = 1 1.10 0.19 1.11
(3) BB with ¸=w = :4 0.69 0.03 1.11
(4) BB with e = 1=3 0.96 0.04 1.59
(5) BB with ²c = 1 and ¸=w = :4 1.08 0.63 1.11
(6) Shimer (2005a) alternative (AA) 0.98 0.47 1.00
(7) AA with xH = 2=3 and e = 1 1.21 0.82 1.24
(8) AA with ¸=w = :9 0.997 0.08 1.00
(9) AA with ¸=w = :9 and ²c = :2 0.93 0.004 1.00
Note: ²d is the elasticity of demand facing the typical ﬁrm, z is an indicator of technology,
²c is the elasticity of vacancy posting costs with respect to vacancies, ¸=w is the
steady-state ratio of the workers opportunity cost of working to the wage, e is the elasticity
of substitution of capital for labor and xH is a measure of the importance of the labor
input.
43Table 3
Ratios of standard deviations relative to standard deviation of unemployment
v v=u f Labor
Productivity
Shimer (2005a) US data 1.06 2.01 .62 .11
Implication of stochastic steady state 2.84 3.84 1.08
Shimer (2005a) simulations of productivity shocks 3.00 3.89 1.11
Table 4
Stochastic Steady State: Elasticities with Respect to Employment and Relative
Variabilities
Spec. Parameters Variable ²d Variable z
Elasticity Elasticity Elasticity Elasticity ¾lab: prod:
of w of ²d of w of z over ¾u
(1) Baseline (BB) 0.43 10.65 2.47 3.44 0.26
(2) BB with ²c = 1 3.96 27.95 8.51 9.03 0.68
(3) BB with ¸=w = :4 3.37 30.25 11.20 9.77 0.74
(4) BB with e = 1=3 0.15 28.57 3.01 4.95 0.38
(5) BB with ²c = 1 and ¸=w = :4 14.76 96.36 30.68 31.14 2.36
(6) Alternative (AA) - - 29.92 30.04 2.27
(7) AA with xH = 2=3 and e = 1 - - 31.25 31.72 2.37
(8) AA with ¸=w = :9 - - 4.99 5.08 0.38
(9) AA with ¸=w = :9 and ²c = :2 - - 1.96 2.28 0.17
Note: ²d is the elasticity of demand facing the typical ﬁrm, z is an indicator of technology,
²c is the elasticity of vacancy posting costs with respect to vacancies, ¸=w is the
steady-state ratio of the workers opportunity cost of working to the wage, e is the elasticity
of substitution of capital for labor and xH is a measure of the importance of the labor
input.
44Table 5
Elasticities with Respect to Employment near Steady State
Spec. Parameters Variable ²d Variable z
Elasticity Elasticity Elasticity Elasticity
of w of ²d of w of z
(1) Baseline (BB) AR(2) .41 41.3 2.54 3.68
(2) Baseline (BB) AR(1) .41 50.8 2.72 3.88
(3) BB with ²c = 1, AR(2) 5.37 40.9 11.5 10.7
(4) BB with ²c = 1, AR(1) 5.22 41.4 11.7 11.0
(5) BB with e = 1=3, AR(2) .13 125.1 3.05 5.20
(6) BB with e = 1=3, AR(1) .13 129.9 3.32 5.48
Note: ²d is the elasticity of demand facing the typical ﬁrm, z is an indicator of technology,
²c is the elasticity of vacancy posting costs with respect to vacancies and e is the elasticity
of substitution of capital for labor.





































47Figure 3: Impulse responses to technology shocks, Baseline parameters - AR(2) employment



















48Figure 4: Impulse response to demand elasticity changes, Baseline parameters - AR(2) em-
ployment
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